By Mira Rapp-Hooper
One of this summer’s most popular strategic studies topics was the opening round of what is sure to be a continued debate over the Air Force and Navy’s Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept.
Critics have asserted that Air-Sea Battle is dangerously escalatory (PDF), as its first phase emphasizes blinding, rapid strikes to disable adversary C4ISR, which would, in China’s case, presumably include deep strikes on the mainland. They also argue that ASB lacks a credible theory of victory.
Proponents, on the other hand, argue that ASB provides a better prospect of victory over anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies than other proposed alternatives, such as so-called “Offshore Control” (a distant blockade). An obvious difficulty in evaluating these claims is that ASB is not a specific military strategy—it is a broad, operational concept whose details are not yet transparent enough to allow for careful scrutiny.
But as recent debates push military and civilian strategists to consider the merits and pitfalls of ASB, one key set of considerations has been obviously absent: What are the political ends with which this military concept will be coupled? And does it suit them? These questions must be front and center as we consider whether ASB is the United States’ best hope for achieving its regional defense and deterrence goals.
Read the full story at The Diplomat