By Rory Medcalf
Australia has set out to define its military strategy -- with China and the U.S. very much in mind. Rory Medcalf from the Lowy Institute gives us his take.
In an increasingly contested Asia, with China rising and America rebalancing, middle powers are struggling to redefine their defense strategies. One such player, Australia, has now done so in a way that seeks to reconcile its extensive national interests with a close U.S. alliance, a web of new Asian security partners and a relationship of mutual respect with China.
It almost succeeds, but stumbles on a critical factor – money. The current Australian Labor government is underspending on defense and so far the conservative opposition – likely to win power in an election due this September – is not promising much more.
Four years ago, the then Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd launched a defense white paper amid furious concern about China’s destabilizing rise (PDF). A much stronger Australian Defence Force was promised with new-generation submarines, cruise missiles, and joint strike fighters. This blunt document and its unusually clumsy diplomatic handling added to a drumbeat of political mistrust between Australia and its largest customer.
But a lack of credible budgeting undermined this vision of projected Australian firepower, and Canberra was caught committing the cardinal sin of statecraft: speaking loudly whilst carrying a small stick, the opposite of Teddy Roosevelt’s dictum.
With a quite different defense white paper launched last Friday, successor Prime Minister Julia Gillard treads a notably more cautious line, declaring that Australia "does not approach China as an adversary." China is listed this time as a military partner, complete with bilateral exercises, confidence-building dialogue and even an Australia-China Military Culture and Friendship week.
The document builds on Ms. Gillard’s optimistic narrative of a prosperous ‘Asian Century’. It offers some even-handed and sophisticated appraisals of U.S.-China relations, and some acknowledgement of the need to watch for and manage risk, but does not fully convey how the Asian strategic environment is deteriorating and the possibilities of conflict rising.
Read the full 2 page story at The Diplomat