By Michael Raska
Synopsis
The emerging Air-Sea Battle (ASB) operational concept has
been riddled with ambiguity and uncertain operational consequences. U.S. allies
in East Asia have expressed varying perceptions and concerns, while the growing
emphasis on the ASB has overshadowed conceptual alternatives and
counterarguments within the U.S. military.
Commentary
THE AirSea Battle (ASB) concept does not specifically
target China as an adversary, though it is predominantly focused on mitigating
the strategic and military effectiveness of the PLA’s asymmetric military
capabilities.
These include long-range surveillance radar and precision
missile systems, integrated air defense systems, anti-ship missiles,
submarines, space and cyberwarfare capabilities. From the U.S. strategic
viewpoint, these represent the so-called Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)
operational challenges, which may limit U.S. freedom of action in the Western
Pacific.
In a hypothetical crisis scenario, in which China would
use its increasingly sophisticated A2/AD capabilities, the ASB envisions U.S.
military response in three distinct phases: (1) Blinding Campaign – striking
PLA’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets from afar in
order to deny their situational awareness. In other words, by reducing the
PLA’s ability to “see deep”, U.S. aircraft carrier groups would gain access to
the battlespace; (2) Missile Suppression Campaign – disrupting PLA’s
air-defense networks by stealthy long-range platforms, supported by
submarine-launched weapons and sensors. By destroying or degrading Chinese
critical air-defense assets and achieving air superiority, U.S. forces would be
able to attack PLA’s land-based missile launchers, surface-to-surface missiles,
and their supporting infrastructure; (3) Follow- On Operations – seizing the
operational initiative by conducting diverse missions such as a “distant
blockade” to ensure protracted U.S. freedom of action in the region.
Allied Perceptions: Reassurance or Abandonment?
Notwithstanding two semi-official reports published by
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and the recent Joint
Staff publication entitled “Joint Operational Access Concept”(JOAC), the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has not articulated in detail
to what purpose, end and degree is the ASB concept necessary?
Instead, the DOD has tried to convey the broader
strategic rationale behind the ASB in the context of restoring and sustaining a
stable military balance in the Western Pacific by strengthening deterrence
vis-à-vis China, and providing U.S. Allies security assurances.
Assessing the ASB at the operational level, however,
reveals that the concept does not explicitly focus on defending and relying on
proximate U.S. Allied bases in East Asia. U.S. regional allies and partners are
thus concerned whether the ASB provides strategic reassurance or abandonment?
Moreover, the key question for U.S. allies is to what degree does the ASB
actually assume active allied participation and contribution in the envisioned
“deep strike-missions” on the Chinese mainland?
Conceptual Alternatives and Inter-Service Debates
Furthermore, with the prevailing emphasis on decoding the
ASB in the media, think-tanks, and ultimately military services, there has been
a lack of awareness of the existence of contending schools of thought and evolving
alternative strategies and concepts that are shaping debates in the U.S
military. Opponents of the ASB point to high escalatory dynamics and subsequent
risks in the possible deep strikes on China. Implementing the ASB would also
require substantial investment in new long-range stealth platforms,
cutting-edge weapons technologies and capabilities, which the U.S. military may
not afford.
Accordingly, there are conceptual alternatives to the ASB
that propel internal debates in the U.S. military such as the Mutually Denied
Battlespace Strategy currently emerging within the Naval Postgraduate School
and the U.S. Naval War College. The “Mutual A2/AD Concept” refrains from
initiating deep strikes on the Chinese mainland in order to gain access to the
battlefield. Instead, it reverses the ASB concept by relying on the U.S. maritime-superiority
to deny access for the Chinese warships in their waters and commercial shipping
in the surrounding oceans. The office of Chief of Naval Operations is also
considering an ASB-alternative that envisions using less stealth, but higher
sortie rates from existing proximate Allied bases.
Policy Implications
Given its operational uncertainties, the ASB concept will
be hotly debated, tested, and calibrated with continuously changing strategic
realities and operational experiences of the U.S. forces. Its future course, however,
will have significant policy implications, defense management ramifications,
and operational consequences for U.S. allies in East Asia.
U.S. allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific such as
South Korea, Japan, Australia and others have been relatively quiet on the
implications of the ASB, largely because they do not share the full extent of
planned operational details. In this context, what’s missing in the ASB debate
is Allied participation. The operational uncertainty of the ASB may thus
undermine future alliance credibility, and increase the incentives for allies
to devise alternative defense strategies.
At the strategic level, the U.S. therefore needs to
clarify the ASB concept in terms of its relevance to the new “rebalancing
strategy” in the Asia-Pacific, while at the operational level, the U.S.
military needs to articulate particular aspects of the ASB in terms of future
Allied interoperability requirements and involvement. Perhaps most importantly,
both the U.S. and China need to enhance their military-to-military cooperation
in order to mitigate increasing strategic distrusts. It is only thenthat the
ASB will not become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Michael Raska is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
This article first appeared on RSIS Commentaries and is reposted here with permission.