By Alek Chance
Why Chinese commentators insist that the “Belt and Road” initiative is not “China’s Marshall Plan.”
Over the last year, the centrality of the “Belt and Road” initiative to China’s foreign policy has become apparent. The initiative — a grand plan to finance infrastructure projects throughout Asia and better connect China with the rest of the world — is central for a number of reasons. The scope of the initiative is stunning in its ambitions. China has already invested great sums of money, and the plan has the potential to dramatically alter the economic landscape in Central Asia and beyond. The initiative also marks a transition for China toward a more proactive foreign policy that seeks to influence the character of its broader environment — something the United States has been engaged in for decades, but which is a new development for China. Chinese policymakers and pundits have been using the Belt and Road initiative as an opportunity to articulate what a Chinese version of proactive foreign policy looks like.
The Belt and Road Initiative has often been compared to the Marshall Plan by both U.S. and Chinese commentators, and, in truth, the initiative is on par with — or surpasses — the Marshall Plan in terms of its size and ambitions. Chinese banks have already invested up to $250 billion in approximately 60 countries in infrastructure projects such as ports, pipelines, railways, highways, and factories throughout Southeast, South, and Central Asia. The China Development Bank has announced plans to invest $900 billion in coming years. China has also dedicated the $40 billion Silk Road Fund to financing the initiative and the newly formed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will also — though not exclusively — finance Belt and Road projects. At the policy level, China hopes to facilitate better coordination of logistics and customs clearing processes, and reduce barriers to trade and the international use of the renminbi. Ultimately, China hopes to reduce transit times, tariffs, and costs associated with ground transportation across the whole of Eurasia, and diversify its options regarding seaborne trade.
The project has already altered political relationships throughout Eurasia. A deal to connect Pakistan’s port at Gwadar to western China via Chinese-backed infrastructure development has brought the two countries closer together, and earlier last year Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed interest in coordinating his regional economic plan, the Eurasian Economic Union, with the Belt and Road Initiative. In May 2015, Xi and Putin signed a brief agreement to explore cooperation. The overland portion of the initiative will serve the short-term aim of better linking the EU with China via rail corridors, but the impact on Central Asian states could be significant. The initiative was launched, after all, during Xi’s 2013 visit to Kazakhstan.
While many of the principles associated with this initiative would look agreeable to American proponents of a liberal order — “open,” “inclusive,” “win-win” — there has been a rhetorical effort among both government officials and pundits in China to differentiate the “Belt and Road” from U.S. foreign policy approaches. Most notably, many Chinese have taken the effort to explain how, despite many superficial similarities, Belt and Road is not “China’s Marshall Plan.” It is revealing to take a look at why this distinction is a talking point.
Read the full story at The Diplomat