18 February 2015

Editorial: China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation


By Rohan Joshi

Recent evidence regarding China’s involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear program should provoke international scrutiny.

China’s confirmation that it is involved in at least six nuclear power projects in Pakistan underscores long-standing concerns over both the manner in which both China and Pakistan have gone about engaging in nuclear commerce and the lack of transparency around China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation in general. The guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a 48-nation body that regulates the export of civilian nuclear technology, prohibit the export of such technology to states, like Pakistan, that have not adopted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Yet over the last decade, China has accelerated nuclear commerce with Pakistan while contending that its actions are in compliance with NSG guidelines, an argument that is not entirely convincing.
Today, China is not only a violator of global nuclear non-proliferation norms, but also presents the most convincing evidence of the non-proliferation regime’s ineffectiveness. The pattern of its behavior on the nuclear front as it relates to Pakistan goes well beyond the scope of what may be construed as the state’s legitimate ambition to be a leader in the supply of civilian nuclear technology.
Some writers blame the 2005 U.S.-India nuclear agreement as having been a catalyst to China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. But this is a false proposition, since China’s nuclear relationship with Pakistan, both military and civilian, precedes the U.S.-India nuclear deal by decades. Moreover, while the U.S.-India agreement was aimed at bringing India into the mainstream of nuclear commerce and global nonproliferation efforts, the China-Pakistan relationship is designed to operate effectively outside of the mainstream.
As Ashley Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted [PDF] in 2010, “…the Bush administration spent considerable energy from October 2005 until the final extraordinary plenary in September 2008—consulting with its NSG partners during eight meetings over four years…to finally secure the special waiver for India that exempted it from the constraining condition of full-scope safeguards.  The current Sino-Pakistani nuclear transaction could not be more different.” 

Read the full story at The Diplomat